Chinese EV Brands Go Global: The Price Shock, the Policy Backlash, and the New Map of Affordable Electric Mobility

The Moment the World Realized “Affordable EV” Might Mean “Made in China” *1

For most of the last decade, the global EV story was framed as a technological transition led by a handful of Western pioneers and premium brands, with affordability treated as the final stage that would arrive once batteries got cheaper and factories scaled. What is happening now flips that narrative. Chinese EV manufacturers—led by BYD but joined by a widening bench of ambitious players—are exporting not only vehicles but a new competitive logic: aggressive pricing, rapid product cycles, heavy vertical integration, and an ability to flood markets with models that undercut incumbent price points without looking like cheap compromises. That shift is reshaping how “mass market EV adoption” actually happens in real countries, with real household budgets, and with real politics. The International Energy Agency has highlighted that price competitiveness is increasingly decisive, and it has noted the striking development that in China, a large share of battery electric cars have reached price parity—or even undercut—comparable conventional cars, a signal of what cost compression can achieve when an ecosystem scales hard and fast.*1

This is not simply a story of exports and market share. It is a story of how the global auto industry’s rules are being rewritten. In markets where incumbents depended on high margins and slow product cadence, Chinese entrants are forcing a new baseline price and feature expectation. In markets where governments subsidized adoption, the same governments are now debating tariffs and market access rules to buffer domestic players from a price war they didn’t start. The result is a paradox: Chinese brands are accelerating EV adoption by making EVs cheaper, while simultaneously triggering defensive trade policy that can slow adoption by making EVs more expensive. Europe’s decision to impose countervailing duties on battery electric vehicle imports from China—explicitly framed around subsidies and injury risk—captures this tension in regulatory form.*2

If you want to understand where affordable EVs will enter major markets over the next decade, you need to track two things at once: manufacturing economics and political economics. China is dominating the first. The rest of the world is scrambling to control the second.

“It’s Just Competition” Is an Incomplete Explanation *2

A common reaction—especially from consumers and pro-market commentators—is that cheaper cars are good, and anything that raises prices (tariffs, barriers) is protectionism. That reaction has a clean moral logic and an obvious short-term benefit: households get better deals. But it ignores how auto manufacturing functions as industrial infrastructure. Cars are not like phones. They sit at the center of employment, skills, supplier networks, and national strategy. When a country loses large parts of its auto value chain, it does not simply “import cheaper cars.” It loses the economic flywheel that funds middle-class wages, engineering ecosystems, and tax bases. That is why governments react.

The European Commission’s definitive countervailing duties on Chinese BEVs were justified by the claim that subsidies in the Chinese BEV value chain created a threat of injury to EU producers, and the duties were applied with company-specific rates.*2 Whether you agree with the policy or not, the rationale shows the real point: major markets are not treating this as ordinary consumer competition. They are treating it as a contest over industrial capacity and future control of a strategic sector.

Here is the uncomfortable question many EV enthusiasts avoid: do you want EV adoption at any cost, even if it collapses domestic manufacturing, or do you want EV adoption that also preserves industrial sovereignty? The answer is not obvious, and pretending it is obvious is exactly how policy becomes incoherent.

The Chinese EV Playbook: Why These Brands Can Cut Prices Without Cutting Credibility *1

Chinese EV brands did not wake up one morning and decide to export cheap cars. They grew inside an ecosystem that compressed cost through scale, intense domestic competition, and aggressive supply chain development. The IEA’s reporting on global EV markets emphasizes how Chinese EV prices have remained competitive and how pricing dynamics shape adoption.*1 The deeper story is that Chinese manufacturers learned to treat cost reduction as a core competency, not an occasional initiative.

Vertical integration is one pillar. BYD’s structure—spanning batteries, components, and final vehicles—changes cost math. When you control more of the stack, you can optimize across it: design for manufacturability, reduce supplier margins, shorten iteration loops, and manage commodity swings more actively. Another pillar is product velocity. Chinese brands refresh models quickly and are willing to launch into segments that incumbents treat as low-margin or strategically inconvenient. The third pillar is willingness to price for share, especially when the domestic market is saturated and export markets become the next growth engine.

Reuters’ reporting on China’s clean technology exports shows the sheer scale of Chinese EV and battery export flows, with EV exports recorded as a major category and batteries even larger, reinforcing that export capability is not marginal—it’s systemic.*3 When you can export at scale, you can treat international markets as extensions of your growth curve rather than isolated bets.

BYD as the Template: From Exporting Cars to Exporting an Industrial Chain *4

BYD is the most important example because its strategy is evolving beyond shipping vehicles. It is building the capacity to localize production, which changes how tariffs and politics apply. BYD’s own corporate communications describe the start of local manufacturing in Brazil, highlighting vehicles rolling off the line and positioning local production as a regional milestone.*5 Even if you discount corporate marketing language, the existence of local plants matters because it shows the strategic shift: if barriers rise, build inside the barrier.

Recent industry reporting also emphasizes BYD’s global sales growth and describes overseas expansion supported by new production footprints in regions such as Thailand, Brazil, and Hungary.*4 This matters for affordability: localized production can reduce logistics costs, improve supply stability, and sometimes qualify vehicles for incentives or avoid tariffs—depending on the rules. It also matters for politics: governments are more willing to tolerate foreign brands if they create local jobs and supplier spending.

But don’t romanticize localization. It is also a tool for arbitrage. If the EU taxes Chinese-built imports, a Chinese company can build in an EU-adjacent country or inside the EU and still deliver price pressure—just with a different origin label. Reuters reporting on BYD’s European strategy has discussed manufacturing plans in Hungary and Turkey and the way production location choices intersect with labor costs and capacity decisions.*6 This is the mature chessboard: pricing pressure isn’t going away; it’s moving around the map.

The UK as a Case Study: Open Market, Rapid Brand Entry, Fast Share Gain *7

If you want a preview of what happens when a major market stays comparatively open, watch the UK. Financial Times reporting has described a wave of Chinese brands preparing launches and expansions, using the UK’s openness and consumer receptivity as a strategic entry point.*7 That matters because the UK becomes a laboratory: fewer formal barriers mean competition expresses itself more directly through price, product, and distribution.

Here is the strategic implication: once consumers get used to a certain EV price point—especially in fleet-dominated markets—incumbents struggle to pull the price back up. It changes expectations. Even if tariffs later appear, the political backlash can be intense because consumers interpret tariffs as taking away affordability they were just beginning to enjoy. That makes future policy harder, not easier.

Europe’s Tariff Decision: A Trade Policy That Reveals the Fear Beneath It *2

Europe’s countervailing duties on Chinese BEVs are not just a trade measure; they are a signal of strategic anxiety. The EU applied company-specific duty rates—publicly listing rates for groups such as BYD and Geely—and grounded the decision in subsidy findings and injury risk.*2 This structure matters because it shows an attempt to look “rules-based” rather than purely protectionist. It also reveals the EU’s dilemma: Europe wants cheaper EVs to hit climate goals, but it also wants a viable European auto industrial base.

Economic research institutions have discussed the potential impacts of EU duties, including the likelihood that imports may decrease but the long-run effect on prices may be complex and not necessarily as dramatic as people assume, depending on how producers adapt.*8 The more important point is strategic: tariffs are not a permanent wall. They are a bargaining instrument and a time-buying mechanism. If Europe uses the time to build competitive cost structures, tariffs can be a bridge. If it doesn’t, tariffs merely delay the inevitable.

And that leads to the hard question Europe must answer: can European automakers make truly affordable EVs without permanent protection? If the answer is no, then the future becomes a choice between consumer affordability and industrial independence. If the answer is yes, then tariffs can be temporary scaffolding. The tragedy would be using tariffs as a substitute for competitiveness rather than as a runway to it.

The US Approach: Shut the Door, Then Subsidize Domestic Scaling *9

The US response has leaned far more heavily toward exclusion. Under Section 301 tariff actions, the US increased tariffs on Chinese EVs sharply—often summarized as 100% tariff levels—explicitly using trade law mechanisms and linking the action to broader strategic concerns.*10 The USTR’s official release about the Section 301 modifications provides the formal anchor: it is not a rumor; it is policy.*10 Federal Register documentation and legal analysis commentary have also described the EV tariff increases in detail, reinforcing that the US is using tariffs as a strategic industrial tool, not merely as a price adjustment.*11

The US strategy is essentially this: prevent low-cost Chinese imports from pricing down the domestic market before domestic production scales, and then use incentives to build local EV manufacturing. Whether you agree with it, you should be honest about why it exists. The US is not trying to optimize global consumer welfare. It is trying to rebuild an industrial base and manage geopolitical dependency risk.

However, there is a blind spot many Americans ignore. Blocking imports does not automatically create affordable EVs for American households. It can just mean EVs remain expensive longer. The strategic success condition is domestic scale plus cost compression. If domestic production stays high-cost, the policy becomes politically fragile because consumers will see “green transition” as a luxury project.

Canada and Other Markets: The Middle Powers’ Dilemma *12

Many countries are in a more awkward position than the US or EU. They are too small to build fully self-sufficient auto ecosystems, but big enough that import flows can reshape their markets. Legal and policy analysis has compared EV tariffs across the US, EU, and Canada, illustrating that the policy landscape is widening and that multiple jurisdictions are experimenting with trade defenses.*12 That matters because as more markets adopt barriers, Chinese exporters will redirect to markets that remain open—accelerating disruption in those places.

This is the pattern you should expect: trade barriers don’t eliminate competitive pressure; they reroute it. The result is uneven affordability across regions and a geographic reshaping of where low-cost EVs become commonplace first.

The Real Driver Behind Price Pressure: Overcapacity Meets Export Ambition *3

A naïve view says Chinese brands are cutting prices because they are “efficient.” Efficiency is part of it, but the deeper driver is the combination of enormous production capacity, intense domestic competition, and the need to keep factories running. When domestic demand growth slows, exports become the pressure valve. Reuters’ reporting on China’s clean tech exports shows EV exports as a major category and highlights the scale of batteries and related technologies, reinforcing that export expansion is not incidental—it is a strategic outlet for the entire ecosystem.*3

This is where global politics gets messy. If the world absorbs Chinese EV exports without barriers, consumers benefit through cheaper cars, but domestic industries in many countries face structural shock. If countries impose barriers, consumers pay more and climate adoption can slow, but industries get breathing room. Either way, the pressure originates in the same place: a production system that can generate more EVs than some markets can absorb at incumbent price levels.

Your blind spot, if you’re only thinking like a consumer, is that this is not simply “competition.” It is a collision between industrial systems.

Price Parity Isn’t Just a Tech Milestone: It’s a Strategic Weapon *1

The IEA has repeatedly emphasized price trends and parity as a turning point for EV adoption, including the notable observation that in China many BEVs have become cheaper than comparable conventional cars.*1 This matters because price parity changes consumer psychology. Once an EV is not a premium purchase, it becomes a normal purchase. Once it becomes normal, the market can flip quickly.

Chinese brands are exporting that dynamic. They are not just selling EVs; they are exporting the conditions for mass adoption: lower sticker prices, high feature density, and financing-friendly offerings. In markets where EVs were perceived as expensive and inconvenient, a wave of affordable models can collapse resistance fast.

But price parity also becomes a strategic weapon against incumbents who rely on margin-heavy vehicles to fund R&D and transition costs. If you force incumbents to cut prices before they have scaled cost down, you can weaken their balance sheets and constrain their ability to invest. That is one reason governments intervene: they can see that unbuffered price competition can become a structural industry shakeout.

The “Affordable EV” Question Is Really a “Affordable Supply Chain” Question *1

An EV’s affordability is not just about the carmaker. It’s about batteries, materials, logistics, plant utilization, and supplier ecosystems. The IEA’s reporting emphasizes batteries and the broader EV supply chain as central to market outcomes.*1 If you want to understand why Chinese brands can often price aggressively, you need to look upstream: battery cost structure, component localization, and manufacturing learning curves.

This is also why tariffs on finished vehicles can be an incomplete defense. If China dominates key upstream components, it can still capture value through exports of batteries, cells, cathode materials, or other inputs. Reuters’ export data underscores batteries as a massive export category.*3 If policymakers focus only on vehicle imports, they may miss the deeper dependency channel.

The hard strategic move for non-Chinese markets is not just building final assembly; it is building competitive battery and component ecosystems. Without that, “local EV manufacturing” becomes assembly of imported value.

How Other Automakers Are Being Forced to Respond *13

When Chinese brands enter a market with lower prices, incumbents respond in predictable ways: discounting, shifting product mix, lobbying, and sometimes accelerating cost-down efforts. But there is a more subtle response: repositioning. Incumbents increasingly argue that Chinese price competition is “unfair” due to subsidies, and they push for trade remedies.

Analyses of the EU duties and their structure show how policy has become part of competitive strategy.*13 This creates a feedback loop: as Chinese brands grow, political pressure grows, and as political pressure grows, brands accelerate localization to bypass barriers. The battle shifts from “can they export?” to “can they build locally fast enough?”

Localization as the Countermove: Build Where the Rules Are Written *6

Localization is the single most important strategic response Chinese EV companies have to tariffs. The moment a market taxes imports, the incentive is to manufacture inside the market or inside a region with favorable access. Reuters reporting has discussed BYD’s European expansion strategy, including building manufacturing in Hungary and plans in Turkey, reflecting how production geography becomes a strategic lever.*6

Localization changes everything. It can soften political resistance because jobs appear locally. It can shift eligibility for incentives. It can reduce shipping costs and shorten delivery times. It can also create new dependencies if local plants still import critical components from China. The symbol of “local production” is politically powerful, but it does not guarantee a local value chain.

This is where you should be skeptical. If a brand assembles locally but imports the high-value components, the country gains jobs but may not gain strategic autonomy. Policymakers are increasingly aware of this, which is why local-content rules and battery sourcing rules are becoming more detailed.

Brazil and Southeast Asia: Where Affordable Chinese EVs Are Becoming Normal Faster *14

While the EU and US debate barriers, other regions are seeing Chinese EVs become everyday vehicles. The IEA has pointed to strong EV sales growth in places like Southeast Asia and Brazil, signaling that these regions are becoming meaningful EV battlegrounds rather than peripheral markets.*14

BYD’s own announcement of vehicles rolling off the line in Brazil reinforces that Latin America is not only an export destination; it is becoming part of the production footprint.*5 The strategic implication is that the “global south” is not simply waiting for Western EVs to become affordable. It is importing affordability directly—and sometimes manufacturing it locally through Chinese investment.

Here’s the blind spot many Western analysts have: they treat Europe and the US as the primary theaters and assume everyone else follows. In affordability dynamics, it can be the reverse. Once Chinese brands saturate price-sensitive markets with credible EVs and hybrids, they gain scale, brand recognition, and learning that can later be redeployed into richer markets.

The Hybrid Twist: Plug-In Hybrids as a Trojan Horse into Protectionist Markets *15

A major misunderstanding in the “Chinese EV invasion” debate is the assumption that it’s all battery-electric vehicles. In practice, many Chinese brands are pushing a mix that includes plug-in hybrids and range-extender vehicles—especially in markets where pure EV charging infrastructure is uneven or where policy rules focus narrowly on BEVs. Market reporting has highlighted that Chinese brands are expanding across EVs, hybrids, and even conventional segments in certain markets.*7

This matters because hybrids can be politically and economically easier to sell: lower range anxiety, lower infrastructure dependence, and sometimes different regulatory treatment. If a market builds barriers only around BEVs, Chinese firms may gain share through electrified hybrids, build distribution networks, and then expand into BEVs once infrastructure and policy align.

Your opportunity, if you’re a non-Chinese incumbent, is to understand that defending the BEV segment alone might not defend the broader shift. The competitive pressure can enter through adjacent categories and still crush your pricing power.

The “Tariffs Will Save Us” Fantasy *2

There is a comforting story some incumbents tell themselves: impose tariffs, block imports, and domestic manufacturers will regain control. That story ignores two realities. First, tariffs are porous over time because supply chains adapt. Second, tariffs do not solve cost structure problems; they only mask them.

Europe’s duties are already pushing the conversation toward alternative mechanisms such as negotiated price undertakings and broader trade bargaining.*2 The point is not that tariffs are useless; the point is that tariffs are not a substitute for competitiveness. If your cost base is structurally higher, you will eventually lose either market share or political support, because consumers will not tolerate permanent high prices for a product that has become affordable elsewhere.

The mature question is not “should we tariff?” The mature question is “what do we do with the time tariffs buy?” If the answer is vague, then tariffs are just a delay tactic.

The Market Access Debate: Why This Isn’t Only About Cars *3

EVs are becoming a proxy for broader geopolitical trade conflict. Reuters’ reporting about China’s export milestones and the scale of clean-tech exports shows that EVs sit inside a larger export machine that includes batteries, solar, wind, and power grid components.*3 When one sector is targeted by trade measures, retaliation pressure spreads to other sectors. That dynamic is visible in the broader trade friction narrative.

This is why market access debates escalate quickly. They are not about a single product. They are about whether major economies will accept China as a dominant supplier of core clean-tech infrastructure. EVs are symbolically potent because they touch consumers directly and affect iconic national industries.

If you think this will cool down soon, you may be underestimating how central clean-tech supply chains are to national security thinking now. The fights are structural, not temporary.

What This Means for Consumers: Cheaper EVs, But Not Everywhere, Not Always *1

Consumers are the immediate winners of Chinese price pressure in markets that allow it to pass through. The IEA’s emphasis on price parity and competitive EV pricing indicates why adoption can accelerate when affordability improves.*1 But the consumer experience will diverge by region because policy choices are diverging. In open markets, affordability arrives faster. In protected markets, affordability may arrive slower but domestic industry may remain stronger.

Here is the uncomfortable prediction: you will see “EV affordability inequality” across regions. Some countries will normalize $20k–$30k equivalent EVs and electrified vehicles quickly, while others will keep EVs as a higher-price category longer due to protection and local cost structures.

What This Means for Incumbents: The Fight Is About Time and Learning Curves *1

Traditional automakers are not doomed, but they are being forced into a race they did not schedule. The key variable is learning curve speed. Can incumbents compress cost quickly enough to compete without permanent protection? The IEA’s reporting on market trends underscores that price differentials remain a barrier in some regions, which implies the competitiveness gap is still real.*1

Incumbents must stop thinking of “affordable EV” as a brand exercise and treat it as a manufacturing and supply chain discipline. That means platform simplification, battery strategy, software reuse, and ruthless cost engineering. It also means accepting that the market is resetting expectations. If you insist on premium pricing in mass segments, you will lose volume, and without volume you cannot drive cost down.

What This Means for Policymakers: You Can’t Have Every Goal at Once *2

Policymakers want four things simultaneously: rapid EV adoption, low consumer prices, domestic industrial strength, and minimal trade conflict. You will not get all four at maximum levels. Europe’s duties show how policymakers try to balance adoption goals with industrial defense.*2 The US approach shows a more aggressive industrial defense posture.*10

The key policy choice is sequencing. Do you accept cheaper imports now to accelerate adoption and bet that domestic industry can adjust later? Or do you protect domestic industry now and accept slower affordability gains? There is no painless path.

If you are serious about climate targets, you must also be serious about affordability. If tariffs raise prices, you need other mechanisms to preserve adoption momentum—such as targeted subsidies, charging infrastructure, or domestic cost-down programs. Otherwise, you risk turning electrification into a political backlash story.

The Next Phase: The Price War Meets the Factory War *6

The first phase of Chinese expansion was exports. The next phase is factories: where Chinese brands build, how quickly they ramp, and whether local supply chains deepen. Reuters reporting on BYD’s European plans and capacity decisions shows that manufacturing geography is becoming a strategic contest.*6

Expect more of this. Expect Chinese brands to pursue local production in politically sensitive markets, to neutralize tariffs and reposition themselves as job creators. Expect host governments to negotiate for technology transfer, local supplier development, and workforce commitments. Expect incumbents to lobby harder and accelerate their own localization and cost-down strategies.

The game is moving from “who can ship cars cheaper?” to “who can build cheap cars inside your borders?” That is where industrial policy becomes real rather than rhetorical.

The Biggest Opportunity You Might Be Missing: Affordable EVs Can Expand the Market, Not Just Steal It *1

Incumbents often treat low-priced entrants as pure cannibalization. Sometimes they are. But there is another possibility: affordability expands the total market for electrified vehicles by bringing in buyers who were excluded. The IEA’s outlook implies that global EV growth depends heavily on affordability and policy support, especially outside the top three markets.*14 If lower prices unlock new buyers, the market can grow in absolute terms even as shares shift.

Here’s the strategic implication: if incumbents can build competitive affordable EVs, the growth can benefit them too. The worst outcome is being trapped in premium segments while the mass market electrifies under someone else’s brands. The best outcome is using affordable platforms to retain volume, then using software and services to capture value over the lifecycle.

The industry’s blind spot is thinking that value must come at the point of sale. In a connected, software-defined era, value can come after sale—if you keep the customer.

A Final Reality Check: This Trend Is Not Slowing; It’s Becoming the Default *3

China’s clean-tech export scale and the continued globalization strategy of major players suggest this is not a temporary surge. It is a structural export capability.*3 As long as Chinese manufacturers can produce competitively priced EVs and electrified vehicles at scale, and as long as they seek growth beyond a saturated domestic market, they will push outward. Markets will respond with a mix of openness, restriction, negotiation, and localization demands.

If you’re a consumer, you should expect more affordable electrified options—especially in open markets. If you’re an incumbent, you should expect permanent price pressure and a forced acceleration of cost-down innovation. If you’re a policymaker, you should prepare for trade-offs that cannot be avoided by slogans.

The story is not “Chinese EVs are coming.” They are already here, and they are shaping the global definition of what an affordable EV looks like. The only remaining question is how each major market chooses to live with that reality.

References

*1 International Energy Agency. (2025, May 14). Global EV Outlook 2025: Executive summary. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/executive-summary

*2 European Commission. (2024, December 12). EU Commission imposes countervailing duties on imports of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/news/eu-commission-imposes-countervailing-duties-imports-battery-electric-vehicles-bevs-china

*3 Reuters. (2026, January 23). China’s power, energy and clean technology milestones in 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-power-energy-clean-technology-milestones-2025-2026-01-23/

*4 Gasgoo. (2026, January 4). BYD wraps up 2025: global sales 4.6 million, overseas market becomes new growth engine. https://autonews.gasgoo.com/articles/news/byd-wraps-up-2025-global-sales-46-million-overseas-market-becomes-new-growth-engine-2007831963937550337

*5 BYD. (2025, July 1). First BYD 100% electric vehicle rolls off the line in Brazil. https://www.byd.com/en/news-list/First-BYD-Electric-Vehicle-Rolls-off-the-Line-in-Brazil

*6 Reuters. (2025, July 22). BYD to delay mass production at new Hungarian plant, make fewer EVs, sources say. https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/byd-delay-mass-production-new-hungarian-plant-make-fewer-evs-sources-say-2025-07-22/

*7 Financial Times. (2026, January 20). Chinese carmakers take aim at UK to supercharge global EV ambitions. https://www.ft.com/content/63d49834-fcc6-496f-a2fd-8bf5bb330bbe

*8 Kiel Institute for the World Economy. (2024, July 4). Countervailing duties on Chinese electric vehicles. https://www.kielinstitut.de/publications/news/countervailing-duties-on-chinese-electric-vehicles/

*9 American Society of International Law. (2024, December 13). Electric vehicle tariffs by the US, EU, and Canada. https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/28/issue/12

*10 Office of the United States Trade Representative. (2024, September 13). USTR finalizes action on China tariffs following statutory four-year review. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/september/ustr-finalizes-action-china-tariffs-following-statutory-four-year-review

*11 Federal Register. (2024, September 18). Notice of modification: China’s acts, policies and practices related to technology transfer (tariff modifications including electric vehicles). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/18/2024-21217/notice-of-modification-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to-technology-transfer

*12 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. (2025, July 22). What the tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles tell us about industrial policy. https://www.fletcherforum.org/home/07/22/what-chinese-ev-tariffs-tell-us

*13 Cleary Trade Watch. (2024, October 15). Definitive duties adopted by the EU on Chinese battery electric vehicles to counteract subsidies. https://www.clearytradewatch.com/2024/10/definitive-duties-adopted-by-the-eu-on-chinese-battery-electric-vehicles-to-counteract-subsidies-to-apply-by-october-30/

*14 International Energy Agency. (2025, May 14). Global EV Outlook 2025: Trends in electric car markets. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/trends-in-electric-car-markets-2